Mehrshad Rezaee; Seyed Ali Kalantari; Amir Ehsan Karbasizadeh
Abstract
Cornell realism belongs to the new wave movements in ethical naturalism debates. What distinguishes Cornell realism from other ethical naturalism is that the thesis adopts an anti-reductionist approach towards ethical facts. Our aim in this paper is to consider the thesis based on Richard Boyd’s ...
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Cornell realism belongs to the new wave movements in ethical naturalism debates. What distinguishes Cornell realism from other ethical naturalism is that the thesis adopts an anti-reductionist approach towards ethical facts. Our aim in this paper is to consider the thesis based on Richard Boyd’s views who is the most well-known defender of the thesis. We try to show that Boyd’s proposal on the semantics of ethical terms can defuse both Moore’s open-question argument and constructivist relativism arguments. Along with considering Boyd’s thesis, we will consider the required premises of his argument like the idea of the natural kind, extensional identities, co-referentiality, and partial denotation.
Seyed Ali Kalantari; Meghdad Ghari
Abstract
On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in Epistemology, there is a normative relation between a belief and its content. On the basis of a well-known formulation of the Relation, which we call the narrow-scope norm of Truth, “one ought to (believe that p) iff p is true”. Our focus, ...
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On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in Epistemology, there is a normative relation between a belief and its content. On the basis of a well-known formulation of the Relation, which we call the narrow-scope norm of Truth, “one ought to (believe that p) iff p is true”. Our focus, in this paper concerns the explanatory role of the truth norm of belief with regard to the norm of evidence, according to which "one ought to (believe that p) iff evidence supports its truth"; we will call the latter norm, the narrow-scope norm of evidence. On the basis of the idea, evidence is not independently valuable, but their normativity pro producing beliefs depends on the truth norm of belief. In another words, as evidence typically point toward truth and that, according to the truth norm of belief, forming beliefs are constrained normatively by truth, it follows that beliefs are constrained normatively by evidence as well. After specifying the idea, we will consider the wide-scope norm of belief, according to which “one ought to (believe that p iff p is true)”. Our claim which we are going to argue for is that the wide-scope norm of truth has a better explanatory role with respect to evidence in comparison with the narrow-scope norm of belief.
Seyed Ali Kalantari; amir karbasizadeh
Abstract
In this paper we will consider the idea of logical pluralism with emphasis on Beall and Restall's (2006) account of pluralism. We begin by specification of logical exclusivism, logical relativism and different accounts of logical pluralism and their difference with Beall and Restall's account of logical ...
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In this paper we will consider the idea of logical pluralism with emphasis on Beall and Restall's (2006) account of pluralism. We begin by specification of logical exclusivism, logical relativism and different accounts of logical pluralism and their difference with Beall and Restall's account of logical pluralism. We show that Beall and Restall believe in a kind of semantic logical pluralism according to which there are different plausible interpretations of the "case" in Traski's definition of validity. On the other hand, they also believe the so-called idea of normativity of logic. According to the idea, the notion of logical validity has normative implications for evaluation of arguments in natural language. Our key claim is that the latter claim undermines Beall and Restall's logical pluralism, that is, the normativity of logic collapses their logical pluralism into logical exclusivism. The study of different formulations of the normativity of logic is less considered on debates relating to logical pluralism. Along with considering logical normativity, we will criticize Beall and Restall's pluralism.
Seyed Ali Kalantari
Abstract
It seems obvious that the mere acknowledgment of a norm cannot explain the agent’s undertaking what the norm prescribes; Steglich-Petersen makes the point as there is no strong relation between normative judgments and motivation from such judgments. To explain why someone does what a norm prescribes, ...
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It seems obvious that the mere acknowledgment of a norm cannot explain the agent’s undertaking what the norm prescribes; Steglich-Petersen makes the point as there is no strong relation between normative judgments and motivation from such judgments. To explain why someone does what a norm prescribes, according to Steglich-Petersen, we need to know not only that they acknowledge the norm, but that they are motivated to follow it. I will argue that this apparent truism is false in the case of constitutive norms. In a constitutive norm, the action specified in the correctness condition is constitutive of what is governed by the norm. I will focus on the constitutive norm of belief to argue that the mere acknowledgment of the norm suffices to explain the transparency of belief. That is to say, I explain why a subject who deliberates whether to believe that p thereby, in virtue of acknowledgment of the belief norm, deliberates whether p.
Sayed Ali kalantari
Abstract
On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis, there is a normative relation between belief and its content. The normative relation is typically formulated by a norm which is called "the norm of belief" in the literature such that "one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true" (Shah 2003, ...
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On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis, there is a normative relation between belief and its content. The normative relation is typically formulated by a norm which is called "the norm of belief" in the literature such that "one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true" (Shah 2003, 2009). My focus in this paper, concerns an argument regarding the normativity of belief thesis which is called "the no norm argument" developed by Gluer and Wikforss (2009, 2010, 2013, 2015). On the basis of the argument, Gluer and Wikforss claim that the norm of belief does not have the role of guidance for the act of belief formation. On this ground they conclude the implausibility of the normativity of belief thesis. The key aim of the present paper is to criticize Gluer and Wikforss's claim. To this aim, after considering the normativity of belief thesis, I will specify the scope of actions which is constrained by the norm of belief. After criticizing Gluer and Wikforss's claim, I will end the paper by an analysis of following the norm of belief on the basis of the normativity of belief thesis.
